# \#grin2020 Roadmap - calling for blog posts with ideas **URL:** \ **Category:** Announcements\ **Created:** [October 27, 2019, 7:28pm UTC](https://forum.grin.mw/t/grin2020-roadmap-calling-for-blog-posts-with-ideas/6327 "2019-10-27T19:28:03Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 67
**Author:** ![tromp](https://yyz2.discourse-cdn.com/flex036/user_avatar/forum.grin.mw/tromp/32/22_2.png) [@tromp](https://forum.grin.mw/u/tromp)\ **Post date:** [February 16, 2020, 11:58am UTC](https://forum.grin.mw/t/grin2020-roadmap-calling-for-blog-posts-with-ideas/6327/67 "2020-02-16T11:58:41Z")
> [@tromp](#): > > Even with BLS, one still needs to store all the public excesses (i.e. public keys), and all the messages. For each unique message, one can then aggregate their signature curve points into a single one. In a keybase grincoin.teams.node\_dev#research discussion, phyro wondered whether MW could have built in protection against rogue key attacks on kernel aggregation and I thought that since sum of UTXO commitments == sum of kernel commitments + kerneloffset \* G + (height+1) \* 60e9 \* H the former being rogue-key-proof (because utxo range proofs are also proofs of knowledge of blinding factor) should make the latter rogue-key-proof as well. So one may not need to store all the public excesses after all. I hope some cryptographer like Andrew Poelstra or Dan Boneh can weigh in on this… --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.grin.mw/t/grin2020-roadmap-calling-for-blog-posts-with-ideas/6327)._